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Executive Summary 
The lack of shared expert knowledge capacity in the U.S. Congress has created a critical weakness in our 
democratic process. Along with bipartisan cooperation, many contemporary and urgent questions before 
our legislators require nuance, genuine deliberation and expert judgment. Congress, however, is missing 
adequate means for this purpose and depends on outdated and in some cases antiquated systems of 
information referral, sorting, communicating, and convening.  
Congress is held in record low esteem by the public today. Its failings have been widely analyzed and a 
multitude of root causes have been identified.  This paper does not put forward a simple recipe to fix 
these ailments, but argues that the absence of basic knowledge management in our legislature is a critical 
weakness. Congress struggles to make policy on complex issues while it equally lacks the wherewithal to 
effectively compete on substance in today’s 24 hour news cycle. This paper points out that Congress is 
not so much venal and corrupt as it is incapacitated and obsolete. And, in its present state, it cannot 
serve the needs of American democracy in the 21st Century. 
The audience for this paper is those who are working in the open government, civic technology and 
transparency movements as well as other foundations, think tanks and academic entities. It is also for 
individuals inside and outside of government who desire background about Congress’ current 
institutional dilemmas, including lack of expertise.   
It was not always such: less than 20 years ago, Congress operated one of the world’s premier scientific 
advisory bodies.  It maintained an extensive network of shared expert staff--individuals and entities that 
comprised deep pools of both subject matter and legislative process expertise.  Importantly, most of 
these human resources worked for Congress as a whole and provided symmetrical access and assistance 
to staff and Members tasked with complex policy decision-making.  Before 1995, committee staffs were 
also larger and more often shared.  Joint hearings between committees and between the House and 
Senate were more common as well. While this former system stands in stark contrast to the one that 
exists today, it also offers encouragement that we can rebuild an expert knowledge system for Congress--
one with even greater capabilities-- by harnessing the technology tools now at hand.
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This paper distinguishes between information and knowledge:  Members of Congress and their staff do 
not lack access to information. Yet information backed by financial interests and high-decibel advocacy is 
disproportionately represented. Most importantly, they lack the institutional wisdom that can be built via 
a deliberate system that feeds broadly inclusive information through defined processes of review, 
context, comparison and evaluation of the implications for the nation as a whole.  Concurrently, Congress 
also needs more expert judgment available to it during the policymaking process, which, for the purposes 
of this paper, means a focus on development of knowledge.  
Today’s challenges are especially evident when U.S. national interests have global implications. Not only 
is Congress notoriously fixated  on domestic issues ,   its ability to understand complex issues in context – 
and understand second and third order implications – is compromised. We have seen this failure in recent 
years with lack of action on vital interests that connect us as a nation – such as roads, bridges, power grids 
and other critical infrastructure.  It has also shown up in debates over enforcement of intellectual property 
rights online, and the limits of military power in Afghanistan. While various factors, well beyond the scope 
of this paper, stymie forward movement on complex, long term issues, I argue below that the depleted 
shared knowledge system of Congress is a large part of the problem.    
Specifically, knowledge asymmetry within Congress creates an uneven playing field and obstructs 
forward movement on policy.   In the context of this paper, knowledge asymmetry refers to the uneven 
distribution of trusted quality expertise inside the institution, which hinders the ability of policymakers to 
see aligned interests and distorts the policy process.  A good example of this is the disparity between 
subject matter information provided to committees versus personal staff in DC and back home in the 
state or district. Committees on Capitol Hill receive the lion’s share of expertise.  
Congressional staff are disaggregated. Take a typical House member. His or her DC based staff work at 
the center of the largest policy eco-system in the world.  Staff back home, however, have much more 
direct interaction with constituents, yet receive far less substantive policy assistance.  This pattern 
continues despite the facts that globalization has blended local and national policy concerns and that 
today members spend considerably more time at home.     
Two vital legislative processes deserve attention as well.  Authorization and appropriations cycles form 
the bedrock of Congress’ workplan. A distorting knowledge asymmetry today is the imbalance between 
them.  Authorization  hearings, for example, are where members engage in discussion, bring ideas to the 
table and deliberate on policy substance.  Ideally, they examine assumptions, make tradeoffs, set 
parameters, review subject matter and set policy. Appropriations is the process where members allocate 
money.  Authorization, in general, has atrophied considerably over the past decades, with far more 
institutional and outside bandwidth devoted to appropriations.  
Fundamentally, this paper looks at asymmetry in two subsets: expert knowledge provision and expert 
knowledge sharing.  
 Knowledge provision:  Who is providing knowledge during the policy process?  What are the 
distinctions between sentiment (polling, petitions) and substance (peer reviewed, credible data), 
self-interest and “big picture national outcomes?” A good example of the problem is the inability 
of Congress to make use of distributed constituent expertise because of a lack of institutionally 
useful or structured relationships between academic/expert entities and congressional offices. 
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 Knowledge sharing:  Is the existing system working? Are there new forms of accessible, system-
wide, inclusive and trusted knowledge sharing arrangements that could facilitate understanding 
of complex issues? For example, between House and Senate, committee and committee, 
committee staff and personal staff, member and constituent.  
Meanwhile, Congress’ focus on information that addresses the here and now is driven by the most 
influential information providers to member offices. These are typically politically-oriented groups, 
advocacy organizations and lobbyists that operate on electoral and budget cycle timelines.  Deliberative 
functions necessary for healthy governance are the casualties of this accelerated pace: comparative 
macro and micro-analysis, forecasting, context, and institutional memory all go lacking in today’s 
decision-making environment.  
This is not a call to eliminate lobbying.  Petitioning your government is, after all, part of the Constitution. 
As retired Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) points out, lobbying is part of the normal deliberative 
process.  He notes that Members of Congress have a responsibility to listen to lobbyists and that they are 
an important component of the public discussion.   “Our challenge” he says  “is not to shut it down but to 
make sure it’s a balanced dialogue.”2  
Ultimately, the political and partisan character of information in our contemporary Congress is not 
balanced, especially within the ongoing process of policymaking. This current condition contrasts with 
the broader vision and inclusive capacity of Congress from previous decades, a capacity that provided 
credible knowledge and bridge building to support the compromises necessary for most policymaking. 
The issues raised in this paper must be addressed for the policymaking process to get back on track. 
 
                                                                    
2 Hamilton, Lee “How Congress Works and Why You Should Care” Bloomington, Indiana University Press 2004 
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 Drowning in a Sea of Noise 
“K Street likes to see us burn out. Then they can pick 
us off for twice the public service salary. They get 
everything we know and it’s still a deal.”  
 (current Senate committee staffer) 
Two characteristics of the communications 
revolution have impacted legislative bodies 
everywhere: the evolution of the World Wide Web 
and the ease of access to information made possible 
by the Internet.  The U.S. Congress is no exception.  
In 2009,  member offices received from 500 to over 
1000 percent more mail than at the beginning of the 
decade.1 Responding effectively to routine 
constituent requests is a tremendous challenge. A 
parallel and even more comprehensive problem, 
however, is Congress’ inability to handle issues that 
require a system wide baseline of subject matter 
expertise.   
This knowledge asymmetry is most obvious 
between committees and personal members’ staffs 
based on Capitol Hill and outside of Washington, DC 
in states and districts across the USA.  While 
committees are deep pools of knowledge, the 
institution is neither supported nor staffed to offer 
standing opportunities for knowledge sharing, 
expert engagement, or to facilitate the expert 
participation in governance that can occur.  Finding 
basic topical information is not a problem on Capitol 
Hill.  Indeed, offices are overwhelmed with the noise 
of incoming information, including from 
constituents, non-profit advocacy, fact-sheets, 
lobbying and commercially sponsored analysis.  
In parallel, often young and inexperienced staff 
resort to search engines and Wikipedia on a daily 
basis to develop basic understandings of issues in 
the face of this information tsunami.  Insufficient 
institutional knowledge and insufficient policy staff 
create a double impasse for evidence based 
decision-making and exacerbate the knowledge 
asymmetry.  
 
The Nature of Asymmetry 
 “Information asymmetry” is most commonly found in 
the realm of market transactions where one party has 
better information, and therefore more power, than 
the other. For example, the seller of a product typically 
has more information about it than a buyer.  While 
there are apt comparisons between Congress and this 
market systems model, the nature of the problem in 
Congress is one of imbalance both inside and outside 
of the institution itself.  Inside, the institution fails to 
provide adequate standard, shared expertise for 
common good outcomes.  
Outside, the asymmetry in types of information 
provided to Congress is caused by an imbalance in 
American civic life where high quality knowledge 
providers lack the ways or incentives to initiate or 
engage by means of their expertise with the legislative 
branch.   
For example, as elected leaders, members of 
Congress must continually make tradeoffs, yet they 
often lack access to contextually appropriate data, 
as well as the staff to interpret it and the technology 
to turn it into a comprehensive and compelling 
description. 
A bill is introduced.  If a Member is to invest political 
capital in this piece of legislation, he or she needs to 
know a number of things: when it was first 
introduced, (for example, is it from a prior 
Congress?) how the circumstances have changed, 
what the source of the language was, what the best 
data driven estimates of its impact are, what policy 
tradeoffs are required, what stakeholders exist in 
Congress (this could be members or staff), whether 
or not the Senate working on something similar, and 
so on.  Individual political needs assessments are 
also often missing, i.e. how a bill or issue is received 
in the district, timing, how it impacts the district, 
who its credible validators are, real time or rapid 
response expertise, polling, and a checklist of 
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SOPA and PIPA – a failure of congressional 
process 
In January, 2012 The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) 
in the House and the Protect Intellectual Property 
Act (PIPA) in the Senate were withdrawn after 
immense popular opposition. While people may 
agree or disagree about the legislation, and whether 
its failure is good or bad, an equally important 
question is what was the process that yielded 
legislative language that served such a narrow slice 
of the interested parties in the first place?    
Much of the legislation’s post-mortem media 
coverage framed the defeat as the old guard 
recording industry vs. new upstart Google. Yet this 
binary framing does not explain the participation of 
millions of internet users, nor the lack of 
technologists in the room while the bill was drafted.   
Clearly, one outcome of the SOPA-PIPA fight will be 
to figure out how to engage a broader range of 
subject matter expertise early in the process and to 
include a robust and more inclusive process in the 
drafting of legislation that has huge public interest 
.implications.  
organized community groups (opinions for or 
against).   
Those outside Capitol Hill continually lambaste 
Congress for partisanship, yet also fail to help 
members and their staff to identify acceptable 
tradeoffs or opportunities to work together through 
knowledge sharing.  The cause of this might be 
ignorance about congressional ethics rules, which 
include restrictions about how members and staff 
may solicit expert help.  No such restrictions exist 
for universities or colleges taking the initiative.  
An enduring problem for 
scarce policy staff in 
Congress is sorting and 
filtering timely and credible 
knowledge.  This means 
subject matter expertise 
that is both relevant to their 
district and useful in their 
noisy and time-pressed 
environment. The most 
adept information providers 
regularly contribute to the 
problem of asymmetry as 
they often stress narrow 
partisan perspectives that 
do not lend themselves to 
the kind of strategic and 
integrated “big picture” 
analysis required.  
Overall, two specific types 
of knowledge are lacking: 
context (institutional 
memory, issue history, 
including cross-cutting 
committee collaboration, 
and forecasting) and expertise (timely comparative 
judgment based on credible, peer reviewed 
sources). Congress’ inability to assess, analyze and 
synthesize or usefully integrate the implications of 
decisions (like legislative proposals or votes cast) is 
creating congestion, sub-optimal and even 
dysfunctional outcomes. The recent public outcry 
and abrupt congressional flip on the Stop Online 
Piracy Act (SOPA) is a good example (see box). 
Another example of discrepancy between mass 
popular input and inadequate outcome is the 
Genocide Prevention Act, passed by Congress in 
2007.  The American anti-genocide movement is 
bipartisan, deeply committed and millions strong. 
While the sentiment behind the act was 
irreproachable, peacekeeping and diplomacy 
continue to be chronically underfunded by Congress 
and even genocide 
prevention missions lack 
simple logistical items like 
helicopters. 
New media is adding to 
this dilemma.   Perhaps 
the best example of an 
overwhelming 
humanitarian call to 
action spurred on by 
social media is the video 
Kony 2012 — the video is  
controversial on the facts, 
but its reach impressive.  
It appealed to a global 
audience to recognize and 
apprehend the murderous 
Ugandan rebel leader 
Joseph Kony. Despite 
millions of views and 
millions of newly aware 
constituents, the actual 
policy results are as yet 
unclear, unfounded, 
and/or minimal.   Indeed, 
a recent survey points out how today’s technology 
results in activists feeling satisfied about their 
advocacy, but remaining dis-connected to the policy 
making needs of members of Congress. In contrast, 
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Legislative dashboards and communications 
management 
Innovative new technology tools assist member 
offices with sorting and filtering tasks. Some 
examples:  
Correlate was developed to help the institution cope 
productively with the increase in constituent 
correspondence.  Among other tools, it provides 
district specific sentiment, analysis and 
correspondence heat mapping.     
iConstituent offers data management tools as well 
as mass communications assistance like websites, 
newsletters and telephone townhalls.  
Popvox provides information curation and a 
technology enabled method for verified constituent 
and local organization input on pending legislation.  
 
 
 
lobbyists know precisely when to engage within the 
policy process.2  
Given the obsolete and tradition-bound 
infrastructure on Capitol Hill, how do we give 
members the power to make decisions based on 
aspirations for mutually beneficial “big picture” 
outcomes? Moreover, should we be surprised when 
Congress makes shortsighted decisions, apparently 
captured by one interest group or another? After 
analyzing these characteristics, the Sunlight 
Foundation suggested these problems result from 
money in politics, and Congress’ tendency to purge 
itself of long-term staff. Hence it is unable to 
compete on policy substance against purchased 
influence.3 Simply put, Congress has less support 
staff combined with higher rates of personnel 
turnover.  
As much as those constitute reasons for 
congressional dysfunction and partisanship over 
results, I argue below that the failure of the 
institution to tolerate cooperation is as much to 
blame – chiefly because shared expert knowledge 
systems in the House of Representatives were 
dismantled in 1995 and the resulting lack of 
institutional filters has created a knowledge 
asymmetry that has paralyzed Congress in the 
global information age. 
Other authors have analyzed the broad cross-
section of formal and informal organizing in 
Congress.  This paper looks at the current 
communications context that surrounds Capitol Hill, 
and then documents part of the knowledge 
acquisition and sharing systems that served 
Congress in prior decades.  It covers four specific 
organizational bodies: the Office of Technology 
Assessment, the Arms Control and Foreign Policy 
Caucus, the Congressional Clearinghouse on the 
Future, and the Democratic Study Group.   It then 
examines two organizations that survived the 1995 
rules changes, the Republican Study Committee 
and the Human Rights Caucus. 
This paper is based on dozens of interviews 
conducted with both current and former staff of 
these information support organizations of 
Congress, and current and former staff and 
members of Congress who are familiar with the role 
that experts played in the past and have a sense of 
what is missing now. However, it is not an 
exhaustive study, but rather it seeks to provide a 
background and overview with an aspiration to 
prompt further discussion and problem solving. 
Is Congress really broken? 
Tabloid behavior and partisan reprisal are not novel 
features of American politics.  Yet they are 
significant problems, magnified in a new way in 
today’s cognitively challenged Congress.  Because 
of the overwhelming and mostly unfiltered 
incoming noise, scandalous photos and snark-filled 
messaging have a home field advantage.  
Institutionally speaking, Congress has no early 
warning detection system and a diminished light 
brigade of trusted, resident expertise to filter what is 
solid, what is untrue, what is expedient and what 
will have long-term consequences for the nation. 
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Slow, peer-dependent and anchored in tradition, 
Congress’ deliberative processes have been skewed 
by today’s communications revolution. Attention 
seeking tactics and misinformation campaigns often 
override civic narratives about our nation’s shared 
future and drown out mutual interest goals. The lack 
of institutional wherewithal for symmetrical expert 
knowledge sharing is made worse by well resourced, 
externally assisted “talking points” style information 
from the leadership in both parties and the normal 
staff tendency to hoard information in service of 
individual members' interests. 
“Big picture? The talking points were often bizarre 
and driven by what was on the talk shows the night 
before.”  
(Fmr. House communications staffer) 
The consistent hemorrhage of moderate, 
consensus-seeking members in the House and 
Senate has negative implications for the United 
States.  The American legislative system is not a 
parliament. “Winner takes all” processes do not 
yield coherent outcomes. They yield inaction and 
decisions by default or extreme stress like the “fiscal 
cliff” that has appeared over the horizon for two 
successive years (2011-2012).  The exit of process 
oriented and consensus seeking members reinforces 
gridlock and hinders the evolution of broadly shared 
democratic practice. National Journal’s latest yearly 
roundup of ideological alignment on Capitol Hill 
paints a grim portrait of this trend.4  
It is important to point out that some participants in 
our political system do not want robust knowledge 
or routine sharing of data and forecasting to be a 
standard feature of American democracy.  Just as 
name brand cereal makers want to eliminate the 
customer’s tendency to deliberate over all the 
breakfast choices in the supermarket aisle, reaction 
and ignorance about long term impacts of decision 
making inevitably serves one interest or another. On 
any particular action, one side will want to minimize 
negative outcomes and highlight benefits.   
Conversely, there will always be advocates for the 
status quo who will stress the benefits of doing 
nothing and the risks inherent in any policy change.  
This paper intends to make the case that using 
modern technology to improve high quality 
knowledge sharing will benefit our form of 
government and the American people. It will 
improve our standing in the world and make us a 
more prosperous nation.   At the very least, using 
data to understand tradeoffs up front will create a 
more honest and precise accountability mechanism 
for decision making, which is key to any durable 
democracy. 
Any person with a connection to the news media 
can observe how partisanship causes dysfunctional 
civic discourse. Yet, combined with the vertical 
consolidation of information power inside Congress, 
it has created a situation where members are often 
pitted against the institution that they serve. Simply 
put, party-leaders punish knowledge sharing.  This  
is a significant bludgeon used against today’s 
Senators and Representatives and contributes to  
system-wide shut downs on its main legislative 
responsibilities. 
It also creates subject matter vacuums, ripe for 
exploitation. The anti-intellectual spirit of Congress  
reached a fever pitch during a recent election. On 
May 8th, 2012, one of the Senate’s most respected 
moderate conservatives Richard Lugar (R-IN), was 
defeated in his Republican primary. The day after 
the primary election Lugar’s victorious Republican 
opponent made the following statement in a 
television interview:  
“I have a mindset that says 
bipartisanship ought to consist of Democrats 
coming to the Republican point of view.”     
Richard Mourdock,  
Candidate for U.S. Senate (R-IN) 
Sen. Lugar, a renowned expert on nuclear non-
proliferation, was also scorned by his opponents for 
cooperating with then Senator Barack Obama to 
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secure dangerous nuclear material.  The same week 
that Lugar lost, veteran congressional scholars 
Norm Ornstein and Thomas Mann discussed their 
new book on dysfunction in Congress titled Even 
Worse than it Looks. Ornstein and Mann suggest 
that Congress has become an institutional orphan in 
a democracy that has lost its bearings.5  
However, it is worth asking follow-up questions, 
related to Congress’ knowledge ecosystem. Are 
there new ways to incentivize cooperation with 
knowledge sharing from the outside in? Can 
roadblocks be placed on the noisy, immediate and 
partisan “path of least resistance”? Is it possible that 
new forms of communications technology will 
generate more critical analysis of politics? i.e. where 
reputation measurements are more available, the 
provenance of information reaching Congress is 
tracked and transparency of interests exposed? Is 
there a way to reward elected leaders who act on 
the interests of the nation as a whole? A first step 
would be to bolster evidence based decision making 
in both chambers.  Ron Haskins spent many years as 
a Republican committee staffer on Capitol Hill and 
as an advisor on domestic policy in the White House. 
In a recent speech, he acknowledged there is more 
work to be done to strengthen the links between 
science, policy and practice.6  
The need for expertise within government exists in 
many places, including at the state level. The 
Washington State legislature, for example, found it 
needed to maintain a rigorous process of 
comparative analysis for policy options whereby the 
funding sources of data is a factor.7 Is there a way to 
create standards of evidence that are widely 
appreciated so that disinformation or significant 
financial-interest bias is called out before it gets 
legs?   
In addition, one segment of the public which is not 
effectively present on Capitol Hill is the academic 
and larger peer-reviewed knowledge community.  
Are we at a turning point where our technology may 
help us benefit from the robust collective 
intelligence that exists across the USA? Will this 
community help create a more symmetrical and 
shared knowledge environment by reaping the 
benefits of local expertise and scientific method?  
Devising ways to improve high quality knowledge 
symmetry by distributing information filtering 
systems into states and districts will not only raise 
Congress’ IQ, it will, at long last, give high quality 
knowledge a more visible, helpful and influential 
constituency. Finally, would improving the status of 
this knowledge also incentivize cooperation based 
on more widely appreciated standards of evidence 
based decision making? 
Filtering the Noise 
Much contemporary commentary about Congress 
depicts an institution with low vital signs in a time of 
global turbulence. This decades long trend started 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and continues 
today in the ongoing uprisings in the Middle East 
and North Africa. These events are happening just 
when American democracy should ideally be 
providing a modern example of sophisticated and 
inclusive participation. Instead, lost in a vortex of 
combative noise and composed of members lashed 
to campaign fundraising goals, the legislative 
branch has become less representative.   
“Think of it as an information cartel. Information is 
either a commodity or a weapon. It’s certainly not a 
public service.”  
(Fmr. House staffer) 
Deliberative bodies—by their very nature—require 
curated and carefully considered knowledge. Today, 
however, reaction, sensation and scandal can 
produce bigger political payoff than institutional 
processes like research, deliberation, oversight and 
compromise. 
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Knowledge Sharing in the Public 
Interest 
Most students of Congress can recount the 
systematic dismantling and atrophy of shared 
knowledge capacity on Capitol Hill.  Congress’ purge 
of its own resident analytical expertise, starting in 
the mid 1990’s, has left institutional gaps that 
remain empty or filled by simplistic talking points 
and highly motivated, self-interested stakeholders. 
In comparison to earlier decades, Congress has few 
entities that serve the institution as a whole. In 1995, 
a rule change that eliminated pooled funding for 
staff and a consolidation of remaining staff removed  
much of Congress’ capacity to understand and 
explain issues in context. The changes destroyed 
accessible, institutionally focused and symmetrical 
knowledge capacity. This capacity consisted of 
expert, long-term staff and internal knowledge 
sharing entities. This informal  knowledge sector is 
often remembered as “the caucus system” but it 
consisted of many types of collaborative groupings.8 
These staff created clusters of knowledge and made 
space to plan together. They were usually open to 
all interested members, and have yet to be replaced. 
What has filled the gap are increasingly 
sophisticated communications shops. Today’s 
information providers are located within the 
leadership structures of both Republicans and 
Democrats. This top down communication 
combined with narrowly focused outside 
information suppliers dominates the internal 
conversation on Capitol Hill. However, this dynamic 
is less prevalent outside of Washington for those 
staff who work in the state or district.  
It is also worth noting that individual members of 
Congress are capable of being deep policy experts 
and of retaining expertise on their personal staffs. 
Ideally, these individuals act as a type of distributed  
 
 
filtering mechanism for the institution. This sort of 
peer-sharing is blocked by trends like partisanship 
and hoarding. Yet the increasing consolidation of 
power to the leadership in both parties inhibits this 
function as well.  Bill Goold is now retired after 30 
years working in several capacities in the House of 
Representatives:  
“One of most profound changes from 
the mid-70s forward was this incredible shift 
of power from rank and file members, swept 
upward into the leadership. It used to be that 
members were able to expect two bites at the 
apple. You’d get the bill and then you could 
figure out a strategy of influence, and expect 
to offer amendments in the committee or on 
the floor, and also expect debate. Individual 
members, consciously or unconsciously, have 
given up their freedom, their rights and their 
capacity to contribute and shape legislation.” 
 Bill Goold, 
Fmr. House Staffer 
This letter provides a glimpse of the value that the now 
defunct Office of Technology Assesment provided to 
Congress and others involved in policy making. John 
Gibbons was head of the OTA. 
August 27, 1987 
Dear Mr. Gibbons: 
Your assessment of implementation of follow-on forces 
attack is right on target. Of particular interest is the 
section at Chapter 4, page 68, entitled, "Areas of 
Controversy and Uncertainty." 
This report is an excellent primer for newly assigned 
officers both in NATO and U.S. Army, Europe.  The 
analyses in chapters 4, 7, and 8 are particularly good in 
summarizing recent issues and views.  
Thank you for sending me a copy. 
Sincerely, 
Glenn K. Otis 
General, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief 
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The Past 
Prior to 1995, Congress was wired in a different 
manner. The former expert knowledge system 
served the institution as a whole and was a key 
accelerator for learning skills of compromise and 
accommodation. Importantly, this more informal 
system disaggregated relationships and issues 
within Congress. Different groups allowed members 
to identify with each other and with issues instead of 
herding them into party identities or positions. It is 
important to note the difference between the 
formal agencies created to support Congress and 
the informal organizing initiated by members 
themselves.  
 Congress’ own expert agencies 
o Congressional Research Service  
o Congressional Budget Office 
o Government Accountability Office 
o Office of Technology Assessment  
(eliminated 1995) 
 Legislative Service Organizations (LSOs) 
Member initiated groupings by subject area, mostly 
called “caucuses.”  LSOs were officially registered 
entities, sometimes with pooled funding and staff.  
Multiple other informal convening mechanisms have 
always existed inside of Congress, from lunch clubs 
to working groups to task forces.  LSOs were 
eliminated in 1995.  Today, they exist at much less 
capacity and are called Congressional Member 
Organizations.9 
For example, in today’s Congress, caucuses are 
mostly regarded as name lists to indicate support or 
to circulate an occasional letter among colleagues. 
Many caucuses exist inside of Congress, but the vast 
majority are loose associations with no real capacity.  
As one former House and Senate staffer put it “I saw 
[caucuses] as inert clubs.”   Yet just a few decades 
ago, caucuses could have their own staff and 
agendas, led by the organizing members. Caucuses 
handled many issues, but for the purposes of this 
paper,   they existed to help members gain expertise 
on “big picture” national issues outside the 
jurisdiction of committees. Global security issues are 
a good example. The informal system allowed for a 
place to talk about topics that the House did not 
control (treaties), generated little domestic interest 
(foreign policy) or where the Legislative Branch was 
severely outmatched by the Executive (war and 
peace).  
These entities were staffed and grouped under the 
official title “Legislative Service Organizations”.  
Some were politically agnostic, others were 
partisan, some partisan but inclusive. The 
Democratic Study Group was a rapid response 
internal knowledge hub outside of the Democratic 
leadership that supplied well-researched, timely 
information to dozens of dues paying Republican 
and Democrat Members. Its service appealed to 
reformers on both sides of the aisle—in 1977, 66 
percent of all legislative staff relied on its 
information.10  All of these entities were either 
eliminated or sharply curtailed in 1995. These 
groups—led by self-identified teams of members 
inside the process of policymaking-- were different 
and distinct from the federal agencies.  
Limited capacity and capability of 
still existing knowledge mechanisms 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are tremendous 
expert information and auditing resources for 
Congress, funded by Congress. Yet they are also 
inadequate for today’s institutional needs because: 
1. There are not enough expert staff to go 
around; 
2. They are cloistered, formal and academic;  
3. Staff mention that “their information is used 
to justify not inform.” In other words, they 
are too slow and reluctant (or forbidden) to 
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initiate policy ideas, much less make 
recommendations that take into account 
the political environment 
4. They are not useful for many policy process 
needs because they are reactive.  
Congress’ one stop shopping research arm is CRS, 
which was reorganized in 1995 at the same time the 
LSO’s were eliminated. Issue sectors were 
consolidated at that time, and the organization has 
failed to replenish top level, substantive staff for 15 
years. Moreover, in a communications environment 
that is moving toward openness and away from 
secrecy, CRS resists even the most basic 
transparency requests—like making non-
confidential CRS reports available to the public.  
Despite painstaking efforts to remain above the fray 
of politics and beyond the reach of partisan 
influence, CRS recently found itself the object of 
GOP wrath over a report on taxation and the 
economy.11  If history stands to inform the present, 
this kind of public controversy and outright 
condemnation will only drive Congress into an even 
greater state of malfunction and self-imposed 
ignorance.  
 “If you eliminate the potential for 
people to take the initiative, you are cutting 
back on the possibility to hear points of view 
that are not partisan, but creative...points 
that would not come out of a partisan 
environment.”   
Stan Sloan, 
Fmr. Senior Specialist, 
Congressional Research Service 
The Myth of Omniscience 
Much of the world outside of Capitol Hill assumes 
that members of Congress and their staff work 
within a symmetrical knowledge environment.  
Many believe that, if the knowledge exists in the 
Executive Branch and federal agencies, it 
automatically is available to Congress. Following, 
they also often believe that it should be obvious how 
member self interests align for common purposes. 
Others assume that the House and Senate share 
regularly.  These assumptions are not true. The 
process of legislating is highly complex with no 
systematic methods to discover or share the best 
knowledge available in a timely way.   
Ideally, our elected leaders could follow a simple 
workflow for critically important issues: elected 
leaders and their staff draw on the best and most 
robust information, make a comparative judgment, 
and then implement the best outcome. But this 
optimistic formula does not match reality. Lacking 
internal wherewithal, it is not safe to assume that 
committees or personal staffs communicate with 
each other about basic information, much less the 
kind of complex and globally impactful challenges 
we face as a nation.   
Few entities exist to serve the system as a whole. 
The same communication deficit is true of the 
members themselves. Some are data-driven 
internationalists.  Some live in districts with deep 
pools of shared knowledge. Others are starved of 
this kind of support. Many avoid conceptual or 
academic-seeming issues as much as possible.   All 
of them spend inordinate amounts of time fund-
raising at the expense of other legislative duties like 
informed policy leadership.    
“It's very hard for an institution to 
function 365 days a year when it only meets 
about 110 days a year…the emphasis on not 
being here has become greater than the 
emphasis on being here.”12 
Jim Dyer, 
Fmr. Republican Staff Director,  
House Appropriations Committee 
Yet the myth of omniscience is a graver problem 
than "they don't have what they need."   Some 
members and staff do have what they need, but 
some have sub-par information and some have 
nothing. Committees have designated expert help; 
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individual congressional offices have ad hoc self-
help. What Congress lacks is a unifying and 
equalizing high quality knowledge system. 
Between 1972 and 1995, Congress had the world’s 
premier common pool of expert knowledge for 
legislators at its doorstep.  The Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) was the marquis name for expert 
knowledge sharing in legislative systems.  Its 
elimination in 1995 left a vacuum on Capitol Hill that 
has since been filled with all variety of influence 
seekers.  Staff and members do their best to triage 
the incoming wave of communication, yet lacking a 
method for sorting and filtering, the institution has 
become fragmented, incapacitated and unable to act 
on the best interests of the nation as a whole. 
Office of Technology Assessment 
“My job was not to resolve the debate, but to inform 
and enhance it.”  
(Nancy Lubin, Fmr. OTA Project Director) 
The organization that most helped Congress situate 
itself in both national and global problem solving 
was OTA, a federal agency like the still present CRS, 
CBO and GAO. Before OTA closed in 1995, it was 
world renowned with an impressive track record of 
helping members and their staff assess and forecast 
the implications of policy.  The OTA was created by 
an act of Congress in 1972 to provide early 
indications of the positive and negative impacts of 
the applications of technology. 
 “It was seen as especially valuable 
because of its non-partisan nature, and also 
because of the bipartisan support OTA had in 
Congress.  The research focused on major 
issues of the day: transportation (in the wake 
of deregulation), nuclear security, politics in 
Central Asia (well before the fall of the Soviet 
Union....) infrastructure (my boss worked on 
sewer issues), and a number of scientific 
projects.”   
Melanie Greenberg, 
Fmr. OTA staffer 
Ms. Greenberg worked at OTA in the early 1990s. 
She recalls the importance of OTA’s products within 
the policymaking process. She subsequently went 
on to become the Executive Director of the Center 
for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) 
at Stanford University: 
“The atmosphere [at OTA] was much 
like CISAC at Stanford: highly intellectual and 
collaborative, full of extremely smart and 
dedicated people, and dedicated to providing 
the best background possible for the creation 
of sound public policy.  It says something that 
the OTA alumni network is still functioning, 
nearly twenty years later!” 
Melanie Greenberg, 
Fmr. OTA staffer 
Origins of OTA 
Starting in the 1960s, a technology advisory tool for 
the legislature was inspired by Rep. Emilio Daddario 
(D-CT). He was later joined by scientific leaders, 
including, the President of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. They and many other 
scientists felt that Congress lacked a body to 
provide technical advice to legislative committees in 
order to match the Executive Branch on 
technological issues. The Executive had created for 
itself the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
and the Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP) for expert assistance within the 
policymaking process, and many in Congress 
wanted something similar. 
The OTA was dedicated to serving the long-term 
interests of the nation as a whole and as such was a 
leader in practicing and encouraging delivery of 
public services in innovative and inexpensive ways. 
With approximately 200 staff, the OTA delivered 
hundreds of reports to Congress on multiple topics, 
from healthcare information systems to economic 
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transformation of the nuclear weapons labs and 
from offshore energy to ecosystem management. 
An indicator of just how accelerated the information 
atmosphere has become today, OTA assessments, 
after being requested by a committee and 
confirmed by the agency’s directors and a bipartisan 
governing board, took 18-24 months to complete.  
The OTA assessment process included extensive 
peer review and consultation. It integrated much 
contemporary academic research into its projects. It 
was also inclusive, and created working groups with 
academics and other non-governmental groups. At 
the day to day level, however, much of what OTA 
staff provided was basic: in-person translation of 
dense technical information and explanation of 
those technical issues in a policy context. OTA 
offered its expertise without an ulterior motive. Its 
goal was to inform the process. Simple risk 
assessment is an example of an ongoing need for 
legislators that requires both context and expertise. 
Committee hearings are another: OTA staff testified 
frequently in both the House and Senate.  
Former OTA staffer Nancy Lubin believes that the 
OTA was unique in the way it supplied expertise to 
Congress.  “Unlike the other congressional support 
agencies, OTA could only write a report that was 
requested by both a Democrat and a Republican.”  
In this sense, bipartisanship was built into the 
structure of the report.  Lubin recalls that OTA 
reports avoided a “bottom line” and instead laid out 
trade-offs.  She notes that her reports also 
consistently pointed out “here’s what we know, but 
here’s what we don’t know.” 
At the time, critics of the OTA claimed that it was 
redundant and that the information it provided was 
available elsewhere.13 A key component of OTA’s 
success, however, was its ability to generate 
knowledge symmetry within the process of 
policymaking.  It gave members what they desire 
most – trusted and credible information at the scene 
of the action. It gave members a joint planning 
capacity that is absent today.  
The OTA put a stake in the ground for legislative 
foresight and demonstrated the utility of a shared 
knowledge system adapted to a legislative 
environment. Hundreds of foreign visitors stopped 
by its Capitol Hill offices. It demonstrated such a 
helpful forecasting model that it was replicated in 
other countries.  The OTA was eliminated by 
Congress in 1995. Its archives exist at Princeton 
University.14  Many reports remain relevant today. 
Caucuses: the Primary Legislative 
Service Organizations  
Also in 1995, House Resolution 6 (H. Res. 6) 
abolished the ability for caucuses to fund shared 
staff, maintain offices and hence act as internal, 
self-organized custodians of expert networks.  
While the OTA was an actual agency, the following 
profiles cover LSOs, which were working groups of 
members in the House of Representatives. All 
caucuses were LSOs. Through the establishment of 
an LSO, members were able to pool resources to 
hire staff who could spend full time in research, 
networking, legislative analysis and strategy related 
to the goals of the group. LSOs were able to use 
office space in congressional buildings, thus 
ensuring greater access to members and other staff. 
Although several working groups or caucuses began 
to function this way in prior years, by 1979, House 
rules required that the House Administration 
Committee officially certify LSOs. The organizations 
had to meet reporting requirements that grew 
increasingly restrictive over time. They were 
prohibited from receiving outside funds.   
Caucuses and LSOs:  the former 
shared system 
This section profiles five caucus LSOs, three of 
which met their demise in 1995: the Arms Control 
and Foreign Policy Caucus (ACFPC), the 
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Congressional Clearinghouse on the Future (CCF), 
the Democratic Study Group (DSG).  Two groups 
reconstituted and survived the rules change: the 
Republican Study Committee (RSC) and the 
Congressional Human Rights Caucus (CHRC).  All 
existed before 1995 and, except for the RSC, 
included bi-partisan membership and concerned 
themselves with global policy issues.  One was 
bicameral.  
These groups were distinct from outside groups that 
provided information to Congress, as they were led 
by the members themselves and represented 
intentional “big picture” shared space inside the 
institution. Caucuses acted as custodians of 
relationship networks and innovation that no longer 
formally exist.   Outside influence was carefully 
controlled. Their service was process-oriented, real-
time and in person.  
Today’s system, in contrast, is attuned to short-term 
campaigns, mostly domestic, and both political and 
issue based. Previously these caucus LSOs were led 
by shared institutional needs and their priorities 
were determined by clusters of members who 
convened as allies on behalf of strategic goals with 
national implications. These formerly shared entities 
provided a knowledge ecosystem that was attuned 
to the long term needs of governing.  Now, most 
caucuses exist to show political favor and few have 
the wherewithal or motivation to serve high quality 
knowledge to the entire institution. These groupings 
are now called Congressional Member 
Organizations and a list of them is available on the 
Committee on House Administration’s website.15 
 The Arms Control and Foreign Policy 
Caucus  
ACFPC was a bipartisan, bicameral organization of 
members working on war and peace issues, nuclear 
arms control, human rights and development policy. 
It was unique in that it had a presence in both the 
House and the Senate, and was headed by four co-
chairs that reflected bicameral and bipartisan 
priorities. ACFPC focused on international policy. It 
provided expertise and contextual analysis.  The 
caucus was made up of arms control enthusiasts 
who viewed themselves as the vanguard of progress 
in keeping the world safe from nuclear dangers.   
This consensus view about arms control as a global 
public good distinguished this caucus from the 
regular committees with jurisdiction—where 
ideological differences and lack of political will  
could stymie progress.  
The roots of the ACFPC reached back to the 1950s, 
when it was formed as an informal working group 
called Members of Congress for Peace through Law. 
It became quite influential in the late 1970s, when 
Edie Wilkie became the executive director. Wilkie, 
who had been a staffer on the Hill since the 1960’s 
hired and mentored a professional staff of four or 
five, supplemented by four or five interns, who 
worked out of a House office building. The 
membership of the Caucus during Wilkie’s tenure 
included between 135-150 members of the House 
and Senate.  
The functions of this caucus were 1) legislative 
analysis; 2) policy research and reports; 3) advocacy 
and strategy. At the end of every week, Caucus staff 
would call on their contacts in leadership, 
committee and members’ personal offices to 
compile “The Week Ahead in Arms Control and 
Foreign Policy,” a publication that would come out 
late Friday afternoon and would be on the desk of 
staff first thing on Monday morning. “Special Alerts” 
would be sent out as key bills and amendments 
headed to the floor. Thinking long-range, the staff 
also produced “Arms Control Impact Statements” to 
help members situate policy in a global context. 
Gathering information was not easy. Specifics of 
committee schedule, amendments and other 
legislative activities were often closely guarded. 
Having trusted, professional staff present in the 
halls of Congress was imperative.  
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At the ACFPC, research would be keyed to 
legislative priorities selected by the leadership. The 
four lead members of the House and Senate and 
their staff often played a hands-on role in writing 
and re-writing reports to ensure their credibility and 
relevance. If the membership could not reach 
consensus on a topic, a taskforce of the full caucus 
might issue the report, or a key group of members 
might be gathered to sign on and release the report 
at a press conference. 
 The Congressional Clearinghouse on the 
Future 
CCF was created in 1976 and eliminated in 1995. It 
was designed “to alert members to the policy 
implications of emerging demographic, 
technological, and economic trends, to help 
members develop legislative initiatives, to address 
emerging policy challenges, and to help members 
communicate with their constituents on long-range 
issues.” The Clearinghouse was created to help 
Congress follow a law, commonly called the 
“Foresight Rule.”  
The rule intended to make future forecasting part of 
routine reporting requirements for the House. For 
example, it required each committee to assess the 
future impact of policy options. This action also 
encouraged staff and members to examine the 
patterns of relationship on issues across committees 
and to value comparative analyses. It generated 
quantitative trend analysis, talking points from 
authoritative sources and “What’s Next”, a regular 
newsletter. Some committees even conducted 
“foresight hearings.”  
 “The Congressional Clearinghouse on 
the Future was one of the earliest efforts to 
focus bi-partisan attention on longer-range 
issues. It is a deep misfortune that this effort 
did not establish a permanent pattern of bi-
partisan investigation of the future. To the 
contrary, the Congress has dismantled 
institutions - such as OTA - which once 
provided non-partisan analysis of long-range 
issues that need to be considered today.”  
Leon Fuerth, 
Fmr National Security Advisor to Vice President 
Gore, 12 years as House and Senate staff 
In this era of agile development and design thinking 
– where iterative and continual feedback is a 
strategy for both improvement and efficiency across 
all sectors, Congress is truly an antique. A particular 
challenge for our legislature is to rebuild the 
institution’s knowledge capacity for learning lessons 
from the past and assessing the future. While the 
OTA performed this task for science and 
technology, the CCF took on the broad swathe of 
other policy issues and sought to help every 
committee develop institutional tools to enrich the 
oversight process with foresight.   
“The acceleration of change, 
interdependency, complexity, and 
globalization make previous information 
systems to anticipate change and make 
decisions obsolete. The United States is in 
desperate need of bipartisan, bicameral 
efforts to create the general long-range vision 
of America and the grand strategies to 
achieve it.” 
Jerome Glenn, 
Author, State of the Future16  
Mr. Glenn is a DC based global policy advisor.  
As a representative sample, some of the issues that 
CCF tackled during 1984 were: the Need for 
National Water Policy, Biotechnology, the 
Implications of Merging Computer and 
Telecommunications Systems, the Impacts of 
Demographic Shifts on Alternative Health Care 
Centers/Systems, and U.S. and Global 
Desertification. 
The archive for the Congressional Clearinghouse on 
the Future is kept at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars.17 
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 The Democratic Study Group  
The DSG was founded in the 1950s to reform 
Congress and to prod the institution forward on civil 
rights, social welfare, labor and anti-Viet Nam war 
legislation. It was run and led by Democrats, yet 
provided an inclusive membership and information 
service. This open attitude promoted productive 
relationships across the aisle. Understanding how 
the DSG evolved provides a window into how 
members act as change agents for the institution, 
but also for broader political and social dynamics.  
The DSG was organized primarily within the 
Democratic Caucus to oppose powerful conservative 
southern Democrats – who held tight power over 
key committees and controlled the House during 
most of the period from the 1950’s to the 1970’s. 
During this time the DSG acted as a nexus of reform 
to build opposition to these “Dixiecrat” chairmen, 
who used their power and the rules of the institution 
to block the liberalization agenda advocated by an 
increasing majority of members.   
Members of the DSG created parallel processes and 
power centers inside Congress to amplify their 
influence. They set up an alternative whip system 
and provided legislative information at a time when 
much of the key business of the House was done in 
secret.  
The DSG was a central and strategic force in 
reforming the Rules Committee, instituting 
recorded votes on amendments on the House floor, 
unseating intransigent committee chairs and 
reforming House procedures and ethics rules. 
During the early 1970’s, Executive Director Dick 
Conlon drafted and redrafted many of the major 
reform proposals that were eventually enacted. The 
DSG was open only to House members and its chair 
was elected by the entire Democratic Caucus.  
 
 
DSG as an Internal Information and Analysis Source 
for Legislation 
An enduring problem for the first branch of 
government is its relationship to the Executive 
where expert knowledge and information is 
concerned.  Congress is disadvantaged:  it has far 
less firepower than the White House when it comes 
to useful expertise inside the process of 
policymaking.   
Conscious of this disparity and drawing on the 
success of reform efforts in establishing a more 
responsive and transparent institution, the DSG 
became a mainstay information source for members 
of Congress, the press and others, on legislation 
coming before the House in the 1970s and beyond. It 
developed fact sheets, “in depth analyses of major 
legislation scheduled for floor action.” The fact 
sheets provided “background on the bill, a 
description of expected amendments, and 
arguments for and against the bill/and or 
amendments.” Over time, the staff added special 
reports as “analyses of controversial issues, and 
critiques of Administration policies and briefings on 
other matters of interest to members.”  
The DSG was headed by a member of Congress who 
was elected to serve just one term, and had an 
executive committee made up entirely of members. 
It was a staff-driven organization. The 
approximately 20 staff comprised an experienced 
and stable research team who worked out of the 
Longworth Building.  
The DSG was funded by dues pooled by members 
from their annual office budgets. Members received 
information delivered to their offices in hard copy 
through inside mail first thing in the morning and 
throughout the day. The DSG’s influence stemmed 
from well-timed research, keyed to the legislative 
agenda of the House, and from long-term resilient 
relationships to member offices.   
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DSG: Republicans Welcome  
“Back then in Congress, the other 
side was not an enemy.  Staff understood 
that. We worked together all the time. It was 
nothing out of the ordinary.  Today we have 
the capability for information sharing, but not 
the Capitol Hill culture.” 
John Hottinger, 
Fmr. DSG staff 
Mr. Hottinger came to DC in the late 1960s and 
worked for the DSG in its early years. He then 
returned to Minnesota to become a state legislator 
and a leader in civic engagement. His quote here 
observes that the downfall of the shared knowledge 
system of Congress points to a failure of the 
leadership to maintain and encourage the culture of 
cooperation. 
Similarly, DSG information was not just available to 
liberal members of Congress. Anyone who paid dues 
received organizational support. At its peak, the 
DSG had over 50 Republican dues paying members.  
It did not have a narrow definition of its 
constituency and did not try to push a policy agenda 
under a liberal label. If anything, it was a reform 
entity. It defined issues in a way that would unite as 
many members as possible to win on the floor and 
to be persuasive to the public.  The incentives to join 
the organization were tactical advantage and 
superior knowledge. In the era before transparency 
rules, items like scheduling, floor information and 
subject matter analysis came through personal 
relationships and human intelligence gathering. The 
DSG provided this type of timely knowledge.  
DSG: 1980’s and beyond 
The 1980s were a time of turmoil for the DSG. 
Closely aligned members – formerly backbenchers – 
rose to positions of seniority and power in 
committees and in the leadership.  At the same 
time, conservative Republicans gained an increasing 
hold on the party in the House, embodied by the rise 
of Newt Gingrich (R-GA). 
The origins of sophisticated communications shops 
in Congress began in the early 1990’s with new 
Majority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO), who 
initiated a message group and brought in 
professional strategic communicators with an eye 
on public opinion. During this time, the DSG 
continued to cover a range of issues, foreign and 
domestic, and institutional reform, the new 
communications orientation influenced the issues 
and its direction. It assumed a more coordinated 
role in shaping political and policy debate, not only 
within Congress, but also vis-a-vis the White House 
and the general public. 
Strengths of Legislative Service 
Organizations  
During the 1970s and 1980s, both the DSG and 
ACFPC saw themselves as reformers within the 
institution of Congress. Though they often worked 
with committee or leadership members and staff, 
they tried to move issues onto the agenda and to 
shape debate outside the bounds of the traditional 
committee or leadership structure. They provided a 
forum and access to information for members of 
Congress who had a passion for an issue, but may 
not have been on the committee of jurisdiction. 
They also provided a training ground for staff.  
Both the DSG and the ACFPC created places where 
staff could work with colleagues committed to 
reforms impacting the nation as a whole, learn 
about the powerful processes of Congress and, most 
importantly, work together to benefit the institution 
of Congress. The CCF and OTA provided a career 
track, helping the legislative branch be adept at 
forecasting and global situational awareness.18 The 
credibility and reputation of their core research 
work products was central to their influence. They 
provided high quality strategic legislative analysis 
and peer reviewed issue research, formatted, timed 
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and communicated effectively in the particular 
environment that served the needs of all interested 
members. 
Two Survivors  
The rules changes in 1995 created obstacles that 
were insurmountable for many organizations on 
Capitol Hill, yet not all groups folded.  In fact, over 
time, some came back stronger than ever. The 
Republican Study Committee and the Human Rights 
Caucus (now Commission) are two examples.  
Most unofficial information sharing groups on the 
Hill are issue based. Others are ethnic identity 
based: the Congressional Black Caucus, the Asian 
Pacific Caucus, and the Hispanic Caucus are well-
known examples.  Some caucuses are situated along 
the ideological spectrum: the Progressive Caucus, 
the New Democrats, the Blue Dog Coalition, the 
Main Street Partnership, the Republican Study 
Committee and the Tea Party Caucus are left to 
right examples.   The Blue Dogs and the Main Street 
Partners are aligned in the sense that they were 
both formed in 1995 and they represent Democratic 
and Republican moderates. The most important 
institutional difference today however, is that 
identity caucuses are minimally bipartisan and not 
one of the ideological organizations is bipartisan 
This fracture means that common interests rarely 
align, and the “big picture’ goes unmentioned. It is 
one of the greatest causes of information 
asymmetry in the House of Representatives.  
 Republican Study Committee 
Unlike its pre-1995 cohorts, the Republican Study 
Committee (RSC) has prospered and grown over 
time.  A glance through its website illustrates both 
traditional ideological consistency and slick modern 
technology.19 Most important is the RSC’s 
recognition of the power of networked 
relationships.   
“[The RSC is a place] where a 
minority of committed men and women 
without years of seniority or formal leadership 
positions can affect change. They can do it on 
their first day in Congress. They can do it by 
coming up with a sound policy idea and by 
articulating a powerful position in debate. 
They can do it by serving actively in the RSC 
and by making it their home and family 
during their tenure in Congress.” 
RSC website 
The RSC has gathered and updated the best lessons 
of its earlier parallel, the Democratic Study Group.  
Its website offers issue briefings, analysis, media 
links and links to sympathetic outside organizations. 
It also highlights active members with an up to the 
minute Twitter feed, video selection and member 
section.   It produces wholesale policy replacements 
to compete with official congressional ones, like an 
annual budget.   Its ten years worth of legislative 
bulletins is an excellent method for replenishing 
institutional memory. All its policy products are 
searchable, some with clickable maps. The RSC is 
inclusive in the sense that anyone may sign up for its 
weekly public roundup, yet the information 
generated and shared at the meetings is for dues-
paying Republicans only.     
The RSC leaders have developed a pooled voucher 
financing mechanism, which allows the organization 
to maintain a stable of the most precious 
commodity on Capitol Hill—dedicated staff.   These 
dozen or so staff have congressional email 
addresses and provide policy research and 
communications coordination for the group.  Less 
obviously, these staffers are insiders, and can make 
all the difference for outside groups between having 
a voice or not on Capitol Hill.   As anyone who has 
tried to convene an event on Capitol Hill can attest, 
highly restrictive rules limit the ability of outsiders to 
gain access, send out event notifications or secure a 
room.  With a stable of Hill staffers and even more 
interns present inside of Congress, the RSC has 
created a nimble and easy on-ramp for its friends 
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and allies.   The information overload of recent years 
has made this shared personnel even more valuable 
as many regular House staff cope by limiting 
technology and not responding to emails from 
outside or unknown senders. 
The RSC has also created a masterful assistance 
network with its allies.  It receives a great deal of 
impetus from the Heritage Foundation, a behemoth 
conservative think tank with a national membership 
and physical offices on both the House and Senate 
sides of Capitol Hill. Its website offers a host of 
products specifically targeted to congressional staff, 
like a menu of visual data aids.20 A harried staffer 
can easily download and then enlarge these kinds of 
tools for a Member to take to the floor for a C-SPAN 
audience.  
The importance of the Heritage Foundation to the 
RSC must not be understated, as Heritage provides 
both institutional memory and contemporary policy 
pulse to its congressional members.  The first 
executive director of the original RSC, Ed Feulner, 
has been the long-time president of the Heritage 
Foundation.    
Indeed, the two groups often seem symbiotic:  
“Heritage provides additional staff for 
both the RSC and the Senate Steering 
Committee. Hell, they used to pay for lunch 
for the member meetings.  They provide the 
glue. They provide the research papers. They 
are outsourced policy.”  
 Fmr. House staffer 
Its social intelligence is paying off. Heritage was just 
named the #1 most popular think tank in a recent 
ranking.21 
Recently, the RSC has begun to explore how to build 
their congressional network into the states through 
a partnership with the American Legislative 
Exchange Council—a conservative organization that 
pilots model legislation in partnership with 
conservative legislators in order to scale it to the 
national level.22 The Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations used to perform this 
connecting service for all legislators at the state and 
federal level.  Its website indicates that it has been 
inactive since 1996 and, in fact, languishes in a sort 
of cyber cemetery.23  
Some ideological groups in Congress have similar 
ambitions to the RSC.  The largest Democrats-only 
caucus is the Progressive Caucus, which is 
experimenting with an RSC like inside-outside 
model, albeit orders of magnitude smaller and less 
well funded.  The New Democrat coalition is 
defunct.  The Blue Dogs have atrophied and exist 
today at less than half their former size.  They have 
recently rebranded and rallied around a new name 
“Center Forward.”  
The Republican Main Street coalition has held 
steady, overlapping partly with the RSC. The Tea 
Party Caucus made a big splash in 2009 before being 
almost entirely absorbed by the Republican Study 
Committee.  By creating an inclusive convening 
space for different shades of conservatism and an 
easy access on-ramp for outside allies, the RSC 
provides a remarkably coherent organizing link 
within the institution.  It offers space for 
participation and innovation while remaining within 
the traditional hierarchy of a leadership bound 
institution.  Judging from its membership and 
capacity, the RSC has enough wherewithal to make 
it a force to be reckoned with. 
 Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission   
Among the best case survival stories of LSOs in 
Congress is the Congressional Human Rights Caucus 
(CHRC) which since 2008 has been formally 
institutionalized as a congressionally chartered 
commission. It is now called the Tom Lantos Human 
Rights Commission.   In 2008, H. Res. 1451 turned 
the Caucus into a Commission to honor its deceased 
co-founder, Tom Lantos.   Commissions are official 
bodies created, funded and permanently housed 
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inside Congress.  They are distinct from self-
organized caucuses.  
CHRC was founded in 1983 by Rep. Tom Lantos (D-
CA) and Rep John Porter (R-IL).  From the 
beginning, it enjoyed significant bipartisan support 
and worked in concert with counterparts in the 
Senate.  The CHRC was founded to defend all rights 
codified in the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Its governance is shared: it is 
directed by a Democrat and Republican co-chair, 
with four additional Members from each party 
acting as the Executive Committee.   
The CHRC has always boasted a large membership, 
varying over the years but consistently counting 
around one hundred members. This level of interest 
is especially impressive for a group whose issues and 
direct constituency exist outside of the United 
States. 
Throughout its existence, the CHRC has been 
dedicated to providing a voice for disenfranchised 
individuals and groups subject to repression across 
the globe.   CHRC leadership realized early on that 
the greatest currency of Congress is to deem an 
issue worthy of recognition.  Its witness panels and 
hearings regularly include non-Americans.  It also 
features the voices of activist non-governmental 
groups. And, occasionally, a member colleague joins 
the panel as a witness.  It has used the status and 
affiliated power of the marble halls of Congress to 
great effect and boasts the longest running caucus 
hearing agenda on either side of the Hill.  It also 
regularly draws official notice to atrocities and 
human rights violations through the traditional but 
highly effective use of letters to the Executive 
Branch and letters to call out human rights violators.  
These official correspondences may seem mundane 
to a casual observer of congressional process, yet 
they can be a lifeline to political prisoners and 
activists languishing in jail cells around the world.   
The CHRC suffered the loss of its pooled budget for 
staff in 1995 just like all other House LSOs.  It faced 
this dilemma with a nimble idea.  Instead of folding 
or existing in name only, its leaders drafted a Fellow 
dedicated to Congress from the American Political 
Science Association to become the staffer in charge 
of the Caucus. That Fellow, Hans Hogrefe, remained 
on the Caucus staff for many years, including 
through its transition to a fully chartered House 
Commission.  
The CHRC has a basic but informative website.24 
Despite very few staff it remains an active node in a 
network of globally connected individuals and 
groups dedicated to the protection and preservation 
of human rights.   
The CHRC is one of the last truly bipartisan 
knowledge sharing and convening entities left on 
Capitol Hill.  Perhaps this is because human rights is 
deemed a transcendent issue, perhaps it is because 
the constituency it advocates for is mostly non-
American.  Whatever the case, in contrast to 
decades past, CHRC is an exception to the rule.  
Today’s groups are often more tactical than 
strategic, and their agendas are political, partisan 
and short-term rather than conceptual and long-
term. 
Depleting the Social Capital Account 
Many authors and long-time residents of 
Washington, DC have remarked on the decline of 
institutional camaraderie on Capitol Hill.  While 
polemics and ideology deserve a share of the blame, 
another explanation for this decline is the 
disappearance of carefully shepherded ways for 
members and staff to earn, bank and spend social 
capital that is based on trusted, mutually beneficial 
relationships. Using Robert Putnam’s lexicon, 
Congress does not lack bonding capital (social 
relationships within identity groups). It lacks 
bridging capital (social relationships across identity 
groups). The staffed and institutionally-sanctioned 
entities in the former shared system provided the 
bridging capital in the pre-1995 Congress.  It was in 
this way that they served Congress as a whole.  
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As much as LSO staff provided valuable 
information, they also increased overall social 
capital currency outside of the institution, on behalf 
of the institution.  Inside the Halls of Congress, more 
staff identified with each other based on issue and 
expertise, not party and hierarchy. But Congress 
also had more staff to make available for building 
relationships and sharing knowledge away from 
Capitol Hill, within the larger DC policy community. 
From speaking on panels at think tank conferences 
to convening non-partisan knowledge dissemination 
briefings, LSO staff were expected to share with all 
interested parties. A similar job description is rare in 
today’s congressional environment.  
Absent a dedicated and protected relationship 
network of staff whose primary job is to look out for 
the future health and vitality of the institution of 
Congress, and whose remit is to focus 
comprehensively on the public policy aspects of 
legislation, this shared vision of the future has 
diminished. 
“Are the parties able and willing to 
articulate a future for the other side that it 
would find bearable?”   “[U]ltimately both 
sides must be reasonably confident that not 
only their own lives but also the lives of the 
other side would continue to be bearable in 
the aftermath of agreement.”25    
Lee Ross & Byron Bland, 
Stanford Center on International Conflict and 
Negotiation  
The Fallout 
Every new session of Congress includes a rules 
package that reflects the priorities of the majority 
and determines legislative process. The rule that 
effectively eliminated the shared system of expert 
knowledge and analysis inside Congress was part of 
the Contract with America, the reform manifesto 
drafted by Newt Gingrich (R-GA) during the 1994 
campaign season.  
The Heritage Foundation was closely aligned with 
the new Speaker’s agenda:  An issue brief hostile to 
LSOs set the tone for H.Res. 6 and the dismantling 
of knowledge sharing organizations. 
“Not only did LSOs occupy scarce 
congressional offices, they contributed to 
policy fragmentation and client-based 
approaches to public policy, often acting as 
official proxies for outside special interest 
groups.” 26 
David Mason & Dan Greenburg, 
Heritage Foundation 
The conventional wisdom about the broad and 
ongoing destruction of resident expertise is that it 
was a masterful, if Machiavellian, consolidation of 
power to the center. Speaker Gingrich and his close 
colleagues benefited. By depriving the institution 
(and thus the minority) of alternative venues for 
recognition, and for well-researched, politically 
salient information, Speaker Gingrich created 
dependency on himself and on his leadership office. 
While this was fine for the majority of House 
Republican Members, it left the Democrats and 
some Republicans in a vacuum. Lacking capacity, 
resources and wherewithal, the move also 
accelerated a trend toward prioritizing messaging 
over content, political optics over evidence and 
relying on narrow interest lobbyists and advocacy 
organizations for information. Although the 
Republican leadership delivered this blow to the 
information system, the Democrats never acted to 
reinstate or recalibrate a replacement when they 
were in the majority subsequently.  As the power of 
knowledge sharing consolidated, leadership on both 
sides of the aisle decided against regenerating an 
expert knowledge system or redistributing the 
existing information in a shared format.  
In a clear reversal from earlier days, today the 
Heritage Foundation itself is on the record 
lamenting the lack of de-centralized power potential 
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inside of Congress, including the demise of the 
LSOs.27  
While some aspects of the Contract with America—
like more transparency—have come to pass with 
good effect, eliminating the shared expert 
knowledge system that worked within the process 
of policymaking has been a catastrophe for 
Congress, and especially for the House of 
Representatives.  
“The House finds itself in a state of 
emergency. The institution does not function, 
does not deliberate, and seems incapable of 
acting on the will of the people. From the floor 
to the committee level, the integrity of the 
House has been compromised. The battle of 
ideas--the very lifeblood of the House--is 
virtually nonexistent.”28  
Rep. John Boehner (R-OH) 
Rep. Boehner made these heartfelt remarks about 
the demise of the institutional capacities of 
Congress in September 2010, just before ascending 
to be Speaker of the House under the new 
Republican majority in 2010. 
This “big picture” knowledge gap has become more 
obvious over time, and is especially debilitating for 
legislation that requires context, expert judgment 
and forecasting into the future. This is a significant 
problem in the modern world, where Congressional 
actions have huge global implications, but members 
fail to connect the dots.  
Examples of global imperatives that have fallen 
victim to Congress’s policymaking dysfunction 
include:  
1. Near failure to raise the debt ceiling (Fall, 
2011) 
2. Holding the START nuclear arms treaty 
hostage to a politicized domestic policy 
fight over taxes and unemployment (Fall, 
2010) 
3. Attempts to regulate the Internet via a 
dated intellectual property rationale that 
would damage American leadership on 
global Internet freedom. See  SOPA and 
PIPA (Winter, 2012) 
In 1995, the Democratic Study Group, the Human 
Rights Caucus and the Arms Control and Foreign 
Policy Caucus had dozens of dues paying Republican 
and Democratic members because they provided 
the best rapid response data inside of Congress. 
Their abolition together with other bi-partisan LSOs 
and the OTA certainly exacerbated the polarization 
of the institution, as members had fewer occasions 
to meet each other and work together on mutual 
interests outside of party identification. The 
problem has worsened to this day and now non-
partisan information is considered less valuable. 
”Until the Congress moves beyond 
this period, you won’t see that kind of support 
for non-partisan information ... The 
polarization makes members and committees 
less interested in even hearing an objective 
view...” 
Stan Sloan, 
Fmr. Senior Specialist, 
Congressional Research Service 
Uneven information and few 
common purposes 
Scholars at the Stanford Center on International 
Conflict and Negotiation have documented the 
staggering costs of protracted political conflict.29 
They point out how correcting information 
asymmetry among fighting parties is one path 
forward. This step moves parties because a standing 
relationship structure is intentionally created around 
shared future imperatives. In the Congress, these 
imperatives include vital national interests like 
reducing nuclear dangers, maintaining a free and 
open Internet, adapting our security posture to 
reflect global change, and raising the debt ceiling. 
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All have fallen victim to dysfunction and polarization 
in recent years.    
“Some will see unilateral conflict 
transformation as sell-out to the other side. 
These skeptics will need to be reassured that 
they have not been betrayed. Leaders will 
need to walk a tight rope between affirming 
traditional goals while arguing that changes 
in the current situation demand new and 
creative means because the old ways have 
exhausted their usefulness. They must make 
the case that zero-sum calculus of the 
previous era can be replaced with a new 
framework that links achieving our goals with 
addressing their grievances. In other words, 
we will only get what we want if we get them 
to come along”30  
Byron Bland, 
Stanford Center on International Conflict and 
Negotiation 
After 1995, lacking a built-in mechanism for peer 
sharing, the benefits from shared knowledge 
infrastructure-- confidential exploratory and brain-
storming discussions, identity by issue instead of 
party, subject matter depth and readily available 
institutional memory-- diminished. These rules 
changes left Congress incapable of processing 
information in context or rendering expert judgment 
– two fundamental necessities for informed 
governing.   
More than a decade into the 21st Century, Congress 
is unable to serve the needs of modern democracy. 
This paper makes the case that an often overlooked 
piece of this problem is Congress’ own failure to 
update and modernize the way it communicates 
shared knowledge, especially analyses that benefit 
public interests and the nation as a whole.  The 
breakdown of institutionally supported systems for 
information processing and knowledge sharing has 
resulted in: 
1. More partisan internal communications 
2. Inability to process complex information and 
especially to sort and filter high quality 
knowledge for comparative estimates and 
institutional context 
3. Greater reliance on fragmented and narrow 
outside information to individual members  
This research points out that—in contrast to widely 
held public perceptions-- Congress is not so much 
venal or corrupt as it is obsolete and incapacitated.  
Psychologists would say the public’s anger toward 
their legislature is a fundamental attribution error – 
the public blames the institution’s inherent 
disposition instead of its incoherent situation.31 This 
distinction is important, as improving the situation is 
imminently more fixable. This paper can help us ask 
two sets of questions:  
1. What functions might expert knowledge 
organizations outside of Congress perform?  
2. How might we strengthen the ability of 
members of Congress to use the 
institutional capacity of Congress, including 
new technologies and transparency rules to 
restore cooperative, evidence-based 
decision making and to promote a culture of 
shared knowledge?  
Steps Forward 
“Stop sending me clickable links! I need context, 
expert judgment and the political incentive to use 
facts.”  
(current Chief of Staff in House office) 
The knowledge imbalance experienced by Congress 
is akin to information asymmetry found in financial 
markets.  One way to redress information 
asymmetry in markets is open participation by all 
interested parties—whether consumers, producers 
or distributors.  These methods can democratize the 
sourcing, verifying and sharing of information.  
What would this model look like in an updated 
knowledge system for Congress? In financial 
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markets, asymmetry is addressed by reputation, 
regulation and effective guarantees (contracts).  
What are the equivalents for knowledge sharing in 
legislatures, where public goods are the desired 
outcome and where painful tradeoffs might be 
required?    
Our own 50 states offer some promising ways 
forward.   Arizona State University, for example, has 
developed “Decision Theater” to help policymakers 
lay out choices and tradeoffs in a complex 
environment.  It has also created a communications 
program to help scientists effectively explain 
complex policy issues.32  
In addition to the earlier mentioned example from 
Washington State, New Jersey’s legislature 
maintains a group of shared experts who are on call 
and available exclusively for their needs. Texas and 
New Mexico both have policy analysis capacity in 
their state budget offices.  The Delaware legislature 
borrows students from nearby universities. Around 
the world, and in the wake of the global 
transparency movement, countries continue to 
experiment with different models of filtering and 
sorting expertise for elected leaders.  Making 
knowledge operational for policy makers in the 
process of legislating is an incipient trend. 
Key Recommendations 
Address weaknesses in existing organizations: 
 Congress could restore its budget for 
legislative branch staff on the Hill and in the 
support agencies 
 Congress could open more data so outside 
groups can create tools to benefit public 
information access  
 Congress could consider creating an OTA for 
the 21st century33 
 Congress could explore creating  knowledge 
tools for public sharing and submission of 
information using 21st century approaches 
 Congress could allow caucuses to pool 
resources and hire staff 
Congressional Research Service 
Congress could do something about limitations in 
CRS.  
 Congress could insist that CRS start filling 
the Senior Specialist positions with 
individuals who have subject matter 
expertise and no administrative 
responsibilities.  
 Congress could make non-confidential CRS 
reports publicly available. It could also find 
ways to allow CRS analysts more room for 
innovation and creativity, like eliminating 
stultifying routines for contact with the 
press or with the Executive Branch.34 
 CRS could adopt some useful mapping tools 
that help Members see consolidated data 
(dashboards).  Showing forecasting, local 
tradeoffs and impacts would be helpful too.  
Universities 
 Experts at universities and research 
institutes could take advantage of 
transparency rules and constituent status to 
make peer reviewed and/or experience 
based information more compelling in the 
congressional environment. They could 
consistently initiate by means of their 
expertise.  
 The land grant university system is already 
decentralized and dedicated to high quality 
research and development.  How might this 
system adapt to primarily serve non- 
commercial public interests, and create a 
new model of informed 21st century 
democracy?  
 Congress could maintain knowledge sharing 
relationships with expert entities or 
stakeholders that have benefited from its 
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support of their research, studies and other 
work. 
Local Approaches 
 Local experts could partner with process 
facilitators to design new methods of 
engagement on deep subject matter – this 
calls for civic technologists and those with 
technical skills.  
 Could local experts create a more nimble yet 
standing infrastructure that could replace 
Congress’ reliance on special 
commissions?35 
 Local media could create modern methods 
of trusted and substantive gathering, 
curation and consolidation for public life. 
Open Questions: 
 Is it time for the communities working on 
congressional reform to step back and 
reassess? 
 Is robust policymaking benefiting from 
transparency and technology enabled mass 
participation the way it is currently 
organized? 
 Are accountability methods keeping up with 
transparency? Is democratic participation?  
 Have mass and money reached their point of 
diminished returns as tools for sound policy 
influence in our legislative system?  
Individuals working in Congress usually receive 
overwhelming information before and after the 
most vital decision making moments. The expertise 
deficit in Congress, however, often occurs during 
the process of policy making. What can we learn 
from other process analysis models--like supply 
chain management-- to track the integrity of 
information as it arrives in the legislative branch? 
Here, the “food to fork” movement provides an 
interesting model.36 
Conclusion 
“My field of dreams? I want an eBay of experts, people 
I can trust.” 
(current House staffer) 
As with any exploration of the relationship between 
knowledge and power, who provides expertise to 
Congress will always be subject to scrutiny and 
debate. Today’s information revolution and our 
stymied policy process have made it clear that not 
all information is created equally. High quality 
knowledge follows specific procedures, most 
commonly known as the scientific method.  This 
sort of knowledge support used to abundantly exist 
inside Congress. Today, the lack of this type of 
rigorous sorting and filtering is the greatest 
knowledge deficit on Capitol Hill. What this paper 
points out is not something new, but that we need 
to re-create this shared knowledge system in a 
modern way.   
Clearly, we have a large mapping task before us. 
When does information become useful knowledge? 
What criteria are appropriate qualifiers and/or 
disqualifiers? Author Andrew Rich has written on the 
modern phenomenon of think tanks and how they 
have altered the perception of neutral expertise. He 
points out that think tanks now compete with 
lobbyists and other interests in the halls of 
Congress, blurring the lines between experts and 
advocates. One result of this type of high visibility 
“expertise” is more opinion commentary and less 
scholarship.  This weakness in the policy process, he 
writes “threatens the quality of policy produced; for 
if trusted research is not available, what becomes 
the foundation for informed policy decisions?”37 
Scholars are starting to notice. A recent paper 
written by Spanish and Australian academics has 
put forward three domains of criteria for identifying 
trustworthy policy expertise: competence, integrity, 
and benevolence.38  
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Modern America faces a global dilemma: citizen 
expectations for meaningful participation have 
outpaced governments’ ability to provide 
opportunities for creating a shared future. 
Moreover, the problem of knowledge asymmetry in 
Congress is not a simple problem.  It is, in academic 
terms, what is known as a ‘wicked problem’, i.e. one 
where those responsible for causing it are also 
responsible for its solution (in this case, citizens and 
elected leaders). As the practice of democracy 
changes worldwide, the United States today has the 
opportunity to develop new methods of informed, 
participatory convening.  The consistent input of 
robust, high quality expertise—knowledge that 
meets traditional standards of peer review—must be 
part of this evolution. Indeed, managing the 
transparency afforded by the push for government 
openness is a significant task that we have only 
begun to understand and address. It won’t be easy. 
Many in government feel overwhelmed by 
information and misunderstood by those who 
demand more and more transparency. 
"We're all for transparency! Okay, 
this is what transparency gives you: it takes 
complex problems and boils them down to 
simple one liners… and that's the price you 
pay."  
Jim Dyer, 
Fmr. Republican Staff Director,  
House Appropriations Committee 
The policy challenges brought about by a 
redistribution of communication power impacts 
every aspect of our contemporary world.  Writing for 
business innovators, the authors of The Cluetrain 
Manifesto offer a key insight about technology 
enabled participation that is equally relevant to our 
national governing aspirations.   
“Conversations are where intellectual 
capital gets generated.  But business 
environments based on command and control 
are usually characterized by intimidation, 
coercion and threats of reprisal.  In contrast, 
genuine conversation flourishes only in an 
atmosphere of free and open exchange.”39  
Rick Levine, et al. 
Authors, The Cluetrain Manifesto 
Intellectual capital, social capital and political capital 
are the primary relationship ingredients for any 
nation’s self-determination. The power of 
relationships is the common currency of politics in 
this new era. Moreover, how this power reconfigures 
will determine our nation’s destiny and influence the 
direction of democratic practice worldwide. Our 
increasingly open and transparent government 
offers tremendous opportunities to evolve citizen 
relationships to their elected leaders and to build 
connected but disaggregated systems that engage 
and serve whole institutions—like Congress. Experts 
have an indispensable and unique role to play in the 
next iteration of our democracy. The Smart 
Congress project at the New America Foundation 
will continue to pursue this expanding realm of 
relationships, knowledge for Congress and national 
outcomes. The project intends to publish additional 
papers in the coming months. The Open Technology 
Institute welcomes your input, criticism and 
comments as we move forward.  
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